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CVE-2026-41277 affects Flowise prior to version 3.1.0. The vulnerability exists in the DocumentStore creation endpoint, where attacker-controlled input is passed to persistence logic using repository.save() without adequately restricting sensitive fields. This allows an authenticated user to supply the primary key (id) and internal state fields when creating a DocumentStore object. Because the create operation accepts a client-supplied primary key and uses save semantics, the POST endpoint effectively behaves as an implicit UPSERT rather than a strict create-only operation. As a result, an attacker can overwrite an existing DocumentStore record instead of creating a new one. In multi-workspace or multi-tenant deployments, this can be abused to modify or reassign DocumentStore objects associated with other workspaces, resulting in broken object-level authorization / IDOR conditions and cross-workspace object takeover.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a working Python PoC (`poc.py`), a Bash lab setup script (`setup.sh`), a Docker lab image definition, and supporting documentation/evidence. The exploit targets Flowise document-store functionality and demonstrates an unauthenticated arbitrary file read in Flowise 1.7.1–2.2.3, fixed in 2.2.4. The attack chain is: detect target/version, create a document store, abuse `PUT /api/v1/document-store/store/:id` mass assignment to inject forged `loaders[].files[]` metadata, then call `POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview` with a `FILE-STORAGE::` loaderConfig containing a traversal path. This reaches the vulnerable `getFileFromStorage(file, ...paths)` path and returns file contents in-band via preview chunks. The PoC is stdlib-only Python and operational rather than just demonstrative: it automates version checks, header-based unauthenticated access, traversal generation, exploitation, and output parsing. The repository’s purpose is to document and prove a proposed new CVE distinct from prior Flowise issues, especially emphasizing theft of `/root/.flowise/encryption.key` as the key step to decrypt all stored provider credentials.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.