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CVE-2026-42097 is an authentication bypass in Sparx Pro Cloud Server. The server makes its authentication decision based on the requested URL, specifically the presence of the "model" query parameter, but later uses the model value supplied in the POST request's binary blob when executing the request. An attacker can omit the "model" query parameter from the URL and provide the model name only inside the binary POST body, causing the request to be processed without authentication. Public reporting states this flaw enables SQL query execution without authentication and can be chained with the related SQL execution issue CVE-2026-42096 for unauthenticated arbitrary SQL execution. Versions 6.1 build 167 and below were tested and confirmed vulnerable; other versions were not tested and may also be affected.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small Python proof-of-concept exploit for unauthenticated arbitrary SQL execution against Sparx Systems Pro Cloud Server via the Enterprise Architect cloud link protocol. It contains one code file, eacrypt.py, and a short README. The script accepts three arguments: a base host URL, a model/repository name, and an SQL statement. It constructs a request to the fixed path /SparxCloudLink.sseap, formats the SQL as a length-prefixed string, pads it to a 7-byte boundary, applies a custom character permutation ('mangle'), then encrypts/encodes it with a custom printable-ASCII cipher using a shared key. The encoded payload is inserted into a binary protocol message together with the repository/model name and sent as a POST request using pycurl. The exploit mimics a legitimate Enterprise Architect client by setting specific headers such as EnterpriseArchitect-Build: 1527 and User-Agent: Enterprise Architect/15.1.1527. TLS certificate and hostname verification are explicitly disabled, allowing use against HTTPS targets with invalid/self-signed certificates. After sending the request, the script attempts to parse the response as a ZIP archive and read query.xml; if the response is not a ZIP, it prints the raw body. Important limitation: the repository author states the embedded key placeholder is intentionally incorrect ('HERE_SHOULD_BE_THE_KEY'), so the published code is not directly usable without recovering the real protocol key. Despite that, the code clearly implements an exploit path rather than mere detection. Repository structure is minimal and focused entirely on crafting and sending the malicious protocol request.
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