Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2026-42298 is a GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability in Postiz affecting versions prior to commit da44801. The issue exists in the Build and Publish PR Docker Image workflow at .github/workflows/pr-docker-build.yml, where pull-request content from an untrusted fork is used during the Docker build process. An unauthenticated attacker can open a pull request from a fork and maliciously modify Dockerfile.dev so that attacker-controlled commands execute during the workflow's Docker build stage. Because the workflow exposes a highly privileged GITHUB_TOKEN with write-all permissions to that execution context, the attacker can exfiltrate the token and leverage it beyond the build job. The issue is described as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability and was patched in commit da44801.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This 100-file repository is an automated research snapshot of Postiz, a TypeScript NX-style monorepo for social-media scheduling. The supplied content primarily includes a NestJS backend (`apps/backend`), a NestJS CLI (`apps/commands`), a Chrome extension manifest/build helper, Docker/Jenkins configuration, and GitHub Actions workflows. It is not a conventional exploit tool with a launcher or reverse-shell payload. Its security-relevant proof-of-concept is the GitHub Actions workflow `.github/workflows/pr-docker-build.yml`. That workflow is triggered by `pull_request_target`, declares `permissions: write-all`, checks out `${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}`, authenticates to `ghcr.io` with `${{ github.token }}`, then runs `docker build -f Dockerfile.dev -t $IMAGE_TAG .` and pushes the image. This creates the dangerous privileged-checkout pattern: a pull-request author can alter `Dockerfile.dev` or any file copied by it, and Docker build steps execute attacker-controlled instructions in a context that has already received a write-capable repository token. The static snapshot README identifies the repository as a disposable academic artifact for reproducing a public GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability and states that secrets are dummy values. The backend itself exposes a broad API for authentication, OAuth, social-media integrations, post scheduling, uploads, webhooks, AI features, billing, and a public API. Several URL-consuming endpoints are visible, including webhook sending and media/stream retrieval; notably, `/public/stream` contains explicit HTTPS/public-address and redirect-hop validation. These application features are not the primary exploit mechanism described by the repository artifact.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.