CVE-2026-44680 affects MikroORM, a TypeScript ORM for Node.js. Prior to @mikro-orm/knex 6.6.14 and @mikro-orm/sql 7.0.14, MikroORM's identifier-quoting helper functions, including Platform.quoteIdentifier and the PostgreSQL/MSSQL-specific overrides, as well as JSON-path emitters such as Platform.getSearchJsonPropertyKey and quoteJsonKey, did not correctly escape characters that terminate the SQL identifier or string-literal contexts they generate. As a result, when application code passes attacker-influenced values into public ORM APIs that accept identifiers, schema names, filter keys, order keys, or JSON-property keys, an attacker can break out of the intended quoted context and inject arbitrary SQL into generated queries.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository is a small standalone Python exploit project with 4 files: LICENSE, README.md, requirements.txt, and a single executable script, exploit.py. The code is not tied to a major exploitation framework such as Metasploit or Nuclei. The main logic resides in exploit.py, which defines a MikroORMExploit class and a CLI entry point. Purpose: exploit CVE-2026-44680, a SQL injection issue in MikroORM JSON path handling. The exploit targets HTTP JSON API endpoints that accept attacker-controlled fields like filterField/filterValue and forwards them into vulnerable MikroORM query generation. Capabilities observed from code and documentation: (1) vulnerability detection using time-based SQLi with SLEEP(5) and error/UNION-style probes; (2) database metadata extraction via UNION SELECT of @@version, DATABASE(), USER(), @@hostname, @@port, etc.; (3) table enumeration via information_schema; (4) blind injection mode for inference-based extraction; (5) optional proxying through requests.Session proxies; and (6) local report generation to text files. Network behavior: the exploit sends HTTP POST requests with JSON bodies to a user-supplied base URL plus endpoint, defaulting to /api/users/search. It uses urljoin() to combine the base URL and endpoint. Headers include a browser-like User-Agent and Content-Type: application/json. No hardcoded external C2 or exfiltration infrastructure is present. Repository structure: README provides usage examples, affected versions, and sample commands; requirements.txt lists Python dependencies; exploit.py is the operational component. Based on the available code, this is an operational PoC rather than a detection-only script, because it includes active exploitation and data extraction logic, though payloads are relatively fixed rather than highly modular.
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
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