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Portainer Community Edition versions 2.33.0 through before 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0 are vulnerable to arbitrary file read through symlink injection in Git-backed stack deployment and update workflows. The bundled go-git handling materializes repository blob entries marked as symbolic links as host operating-system symlinks. Apart from one specifically excluded Git metadata file, symlink paths are not validated. Portainer subsequently reads the configured stack entry-point file using an operation that follows symbolic links, returning the referenced host file contents to the authenticated requester.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Bash exploit script (exploit.sh) plus a README describing CVE-2026-44881 in Portainer CE. The exploit is a real end-to-end operational PoC, not a detector. Its purpose is to chain two issues/conditions: an exposed target .git directory used to recover low-privilege Portainer credentials, and Portainer's vulnerable Git-backed stack deployment flow where a symlinked docker-compose.yml can be cloned into the stack working tree and later read through the Portainer API. The script structure is staged: argument parsing and dependency checks; optional .git dumping via git-dumper or a built-in dumb-HTTP fallback; Portainer authentication and endpoint discovery; creation of an attacker-controlled Git repository served over git://; creation of a benign Git-backed stack; replacement of docker-compose.yml with a relative symlink to a sensitive file; triggering /api/stacks/{id}/git/redeploy; reading the leaked content from /api/stacks/{id}/file; and optional SSH login using the stolen key. The main exploit capability is arbitrary file read as the Portainer process, with practical post-exploitation demonstrated by stealing /mnt/host/root/.ssh/id_rsa and logging in as root. The repository is small, focused, and purpose-built for exploitation of vulnerable Portainer deployments in lab/authorized environments.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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