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CVE-2026-45321 is a software supply chain vulnerability affecting TanStack’s npm publishing pipeline. The issue arose from a chained exploitation path in the TanStack/router GitHub Actions environment that combined a pull_request_target workflow trust-boundary failure, cache poisoning across the fork-to-base repository boundary, and extraction of a legitimately minted OIDC token from the GitHub Actions runner’s memory. This allowed an attacker to execute fork-controlled code in a privileged CI context, poison build dependencies restored by a later legitimate release workflow, recover the runner’s federated publishing token, and then publish malicious package versions directly to the npm registry under TanStack’s trusted identity. As a result, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published within minutes. Because the attacker abused the legitimate trusted-publisher path rather than stolen maintainer registry credentials, the malicious releases carried valid provenance attestations and appeared to originate from the authentic release pipeline. The published packages contained credential-stealing malware intended to execute in downstream developer and CI/CD environments.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (10 hidden).
This repository is a small educational lab that simulates an npm supply-chain attack associated with CVE-2026-45321/TanStack-themed compromise scenarios. It is not a full offensive toolkit; instead, it demonstrates how a malicious package can achieve install-time code execution through the npm `postinstall` lifecycle hook and how similar behavior could affect CI/CD pipelines. Repository structure: `attacker-package/` contains the core exploit logic, including `package.json` and `payload.js`; `fake-repo/` contains a GitHub Actions workflow simulation (`test.yml`) showing how CI could invoke installation of the malicious package; `victim-project/` is a placeholder directory representing the victim environment. The main exploit capability resides in `attacker-package/package.json`, which defines `postinstall: node payload.js`, causing `payload.js` to run automatically when the package is installed. The payload itself is simple but functional: it imports Node's `os` and `fs` modules, prints a marker string indicating execution, collects `USER`, hostname, and platform information, and writes that data to `loot.txt`. There is no network exfiltration, persistence, privilege escalation, or remote command-and-control in the provided code. As such, the exploit is operational as a local proof of install-time execution, but the payload is basic and hardcoded. The CI/CD simulation in `fake-repo/test.yml` uses a `pull_request_target` workflow and demonstrates how an install step could execute attacker-controlled package code on a GitHub Actions runner. This reinforces the repository's purpose as a supply-chain and CI/CD abuse demonstration rather than a stealthy real-world malware sample.
This repository is a small educational proof-of-concept simulating an npm supply-chain compromise associated with CVE-2026-45321 and a TanStack-themed package name. The repo contains 5 files: a README, a GitHub Actions workflow snippet (`download (2)`), an npm lockfile-like JSON (`download (7)`), a package manifest mislabeled as `payload.js`, and a JavaScript payload mislabeled as `tanstack-react-router-1.169.5.tgz`. Despite the filename/content mismatch, the intended structure is clear from the README. Core exploit behavior: the malicious package impersonates `@tanstack/react-router` version `1.169.5` and defines a `postinstall` script (`node payload.js`). When the victim installs the tarball, npm executes the lifecycle hook automatically. The payload then collects simple host metadata (`USER`, hostname, platform), prints a marker string (`=== MALICIOUS PAYLOAD EXECUTED ===`), and writes the data to `loot.txt`. This demonstrates install-time arbitrary code execution rather than remote exploitation. The repository does not contain a full offensive framework and is not a detection script. It is an operational PoC because it includes a working payload, though the payload is basic and hardcoded. The main attack vectors are supply-chain compromise of a dependency, CI/CD execution through GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflows that run `npm install`, and local file-based package installation via a tarball path. No external C2, exfiltration endpoint, or network beaconing is present in the code; all observable actions are local file writes and console output. Notable endpoints and artifacts include the local tarball path `../attacker-package/tanstack-react-router-1.169.5.tgz`, the output file `loot.txt`, the lifecycle command `node payload.js`, and references to GitHub, NVD, npm, and GitHub Actions documentation. Overall, the repository’s purpose is to demonstrate how a malicious npm package can abuse lifecycle hooks to gain code execution during dependency installation, especially in developer or CI environments that implicitly trust package installs.
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46 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A CVE explicitly associated with the TeamPCP software supply chain campaign, but the content provides no technical details about the flaw itself.
A specific CVE associated with the TeamPCP software supply-chain campaign; the content does not describe the flaw type or affected product.
A vulnerability/tracking identifier associated with the TanStack / Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain compromise that CISA added to KEV and set a remediation deadline for.
A tracking vulnerability identifier associated with the TanStack / Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign that CISA added to the KEV catalog, indicating known exploitation tied to the broader campaign.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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