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CVE-2026-46457 is an improper input validation vulnerability in Apache Camel's camel-nats component. In affected releases, inbound NATS headers are mapped into the Camel Exchange using a default header filter configuration that does not define inbound filtering rules. Consequently, client-supplied headers in the Camel internal-control namespace are accepted and propagated through routes, including across direct, seda, and vm endpoints. A publisher can use injected control headers to alter the behavior of downstream route producers, such as influencing HTTP destinations, file naming, or SQL query behavior.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a working Java/Spring Boot proof-of-concept reproducer for CVE-2026-46457, an inbound header-injection flaw in Apache Camel's camel-nats component. It is not part of a larger exploit framework. The project contains a small Spring Boot application, an Apache Camel route, an attacker controller, a sink controller, Maven build metadata, and Docker assets to launch both the vulnerable app and a NATS server. Core exploit flow: VictimRoute consumes messages from the NATS subject 'cve' using camel-nats and forwards them to a fixed HTTP backend at http://localhost:8080/legit-backend. Because affected camel-nats versions do not filter inbound Camel control headers, a publisher can attach a NATS header such as CamelHttpUri. Camel copies that header into the Exchange, and the downstream camel-http producer honors it as the request URI. ExploitController exposes /exploit/attack, connects to NATS, publishes one benign message and then one malicious message with CamelHttpUri set to http://localhost:8080/internal/secret?leak=<marker>. SinkController provides /legit-backend and /internal/secret and records whether the internal endpoint was reached, proving SSRF. Repository structure and purpose: - Application.java: Spring Boot entry point. - VictimRoute.java: vulnerable Camel route from NATS to HTTP; main victim logic. - ExploitController.java: attacker driver that publishes crafted NATS messages and reports success. - SinkController.java: local HTTP endpoints used to demonstrate intended routing versus SSRF redirection. - pom.xml: declares Spring Boot plus camel-nats-starter and camel-http-starter, pinned to vulnerable Camel 4.18.2. - docker-compose.yml / Dockerfile: launch NATS 2.10 and the reproducer app. - README.md: detailed vulnerability explanation, affected/fixed versions, and reproduction steps. Main exploit capability: server-side request forgery via message-header injection. The PoC specifically demonstrates CamelHttpUri steering, but the README notes the same primitive could affect other header-controlled producers such as file or SQL routes. The exploit is operational rather than weaponized: it includes a concrete payload and end-to-end trigger path, but it is a self-contained reproducer with hardcoded local targets rather than a generalized offensive toolkit.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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