OpenAM Community Edition contains an authorization bypass in the stateful OAuth2 token-read path. According to the provided advisory, if an attacker can place attacker-controlled JSON into the shared Core Token Store under a known identifier, OpenAM will accept that data when reading stateful OAuth2 token material, allowing minting of arbitrary OAuth2 bearer tokens and OIDC ID tokens. The forged token content can include attacker-chosen subject, client, realm, and scope values. The issue affects token validation/trust decisions in the OAuth2/OIDC flow rather than creation of a full OpenAM SSO session.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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Patch, then assume compromise.
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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