Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2026-47102 is an improper privilege-management vulnerability in LiteLLM versions before 1.83.10. The /user/update endpoint restricts a caller to updating its own account but does not enforce an allowlist of mutable fields. An authorized caller can modify its own user_role field to proxy_admin, thereby escalating to the LiteLLM proxy administrator role.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains two related Python exploit implementations for CVE-2026-40217, a LiteLLM authenticated RCE via the POST /guardrails/test_custom_code endpoint. The repo is not part of a major exploit framework. Structure-wise, the top level includes a generic README, license, a main PoC script at CVE-2026-40217/cve-2026-40217.py, dependency files, and a targets list. It also embeds a more complete nested PoC project under CVE-2026-40217/CVE-2026-40217-PoC-learner202649/ with its own README, docker-compose lab, advisory notes, exploit module, payload generator, and screenshot artifacts. The nested exploit/exploit.py is the more technically coherent exploit. It uses requests to authenticate with a Bearer token and POST JSON to the vulnerable endpoint. Its companion exploit/payload.py generates a malicious custom_code function that bypasses LiteLLM's regex-based sandbox by constructing blocked identifiers indirectly, rewriting a generator code object's co_names via object.__setattr__ and code.replace(), recovering __globals__/__builtins__/__import__, and finally invoking os.popen(command).read(). This returns command output in the JSON response under result.rce. It also supports an interactive shell loop, proxying through an intercepting proxy, configurable timeout, and optional SSL verification disablement. The top-level cve-2026-40217.py is a more aggressive operational PoC. It supports single-target or file-based multi-target exploitation with threading, command obfuscation modes, optional reverse-shell command generation, and colored console output. However, its payload format differs from the nested PoC and appears less aligned with the documented vulnerable API schema; it may be less reliable than the nested exploit. Still, its intended capability is clear: submit malicious custom guardrail code to achieve command execution, including a bash reverse shell using /dev/tcp/<lhost>/<lport>. The docker-compose file provides a reproducible lab by exposing a pinned vulnerable LiteLLM image on port 4000 with a known master key and a patched comparison instance on port 4001. Overall, this is a real exploit repository focused on authenticated web/API exploitation of LiteLLM's custom guardrail testing feature to obtain arbitrary command execution, often as root in the default containerized deployment.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A network-reachable vulnerability requiring low privileges, with high impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Exploits are reported as available, and a patch was published on 2026-06-28.
A privilege escalation flaw in LiteLLM's /user/update endpoint that allows modification of protected fields, enabling promotion to proxy_admin.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.