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CVE-2026-47103 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Python StateMachine versions 3.0.0 before 3.2.0. The flaw arises when the SCXMLProcessor handles attacker-controlled SCXML documents containing crafted <data expr="..."> attributes. Expression strings from these attributes are passed through the processing chain to Python’s built-in eval() without sandboxing or safe expression handling. As a result, untrusted input can be evaluated as Python code, allowing arbitrary code execution within the context of the hosting process.
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<data expr="..."> attributes or other untrusted executable expression content.Patch, then assume compromise.
<data expr> content is no longer evaluated through unsafe eval() behavior.1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-47103, a remote code execution issue in python-statemachine's SCXML processing path. The repo contains two documentation files (README.md and exploit_walkthrough.md), one dependency file (requirements.txt pinning python-statemachine==3.1.2), and two Python scripts that implement the PoC. package_builder.py constructs a malicious SCXML document at malicious-charts/data_expr_start.scxml containing a <data expr="..."> attribute whose expression is Python code. The payload is intentionally benign and writes marker.txt in the PoC directory. run_poc.py imports the real installed statemachine package, uses statemachine.io.scxml.processor.SCXMLProcessor to parse the generated SCXML file, calls processor.start(), and verifies that marker.txt appears only after start() executes. This demonstrates that attacker-controlled SCXML expression text reaches Python eval() and executes in the host process. There are no outbound network callbacks, shells, persistence, or destructive actions; the exploit capability shown is arbitrary Python code execution via crafted SCXML input. The likely real-world attack surface is any application feature that accepts uploaded, generated, or otherwise attacker-influenced SCXML/workflow definitions and processes them with vulnerable python-statemachine versions.
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