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Apache Camel CXF and Knative HTTP header filter strategies fail to configure inbound filtering for Camel-internal headers. The affected CxfRsHeaderFilterStrategy, CxfHeaderFilterStrategy, and KnativeHttpHeaderFilterStrategy filter outbound internal headers but accept attacker-supplied inbound headers at CXF-RS and CXF-SOAP HTTP endpoints. An unauthenticated attacker can inject headers such as CamelExecCommandExecutable or CamelFileName. If the receiving route forwards the message to a header-driven component, injected values can override route-configured values. Affected releases are Apache Camel 3.18.0 through versions before 4.14.6, and 4.15.0 through versions before 4.18.2.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a self-contained Java/Spring Boot proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-47323 in Apache Camel, specifically demonstrating inbound header injection through camel-cxf-rest (CXF-RS) leading to remote command execution via camel-exec. The project is not part of a common exploit framework; it is a standalone reproducer. Repository structure is small and focused: Application.java starts the Spring Boot app; ApiResource.java defines the JAX-RS contract for GET /api/ping; VictimRoute.java creates the vulnerable Camel route from cxfrs://http://0.0.0.0:9000/service?resourceClasses=com.example.ApiResource to exec:echo?args=hello; ExploitController.java acts as the attacker and exposes /exploit/attack on port 8080 to drive the demonstration; application.properties sets server.port=8080 and Camel runtime options. Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml package the app into a single containerized service. Main exploit capability: unauthenticated HTTP header injection into a CXF-RS endpoint. The vulnerable behavior is that Camel's affected header filter strategy does not filter inbound Camel* headers, allowing attacker-supplied headers such as CamelExecCommandExecutable and CamelExecCommandArgs to reach the Exchange. Because the downstream producer is camel-exec, those headers override the route's configured command. In the PoC, a benign request first shows no effect, then a second request injects CamelExecCommandExecutable=/usr/bin/touch and CamelExecCommandArgs=/tmp/pwned, causing creation of /tmp/pwned and proving RCE. The exploit is operational rather than weaponized: it contains a working payload and end-to-end trigger logic, but the payload is hardcoded and intended for demonstration. It is not merely a detector; it actively triggers the vulnerable path and verifies command execution by checking for the marker file. The README also notes adjacent impact beyond RCE, including arbitrary file write via CamelFileName when routes forward to camel-file, but the included code specifically demonstrates command execution through camel-exec.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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