CVE-2026-48017 is a remote code execution vulnerability in DbGate affecting versions 7.1.8 and earlier. The flaw is in the POST /runners/load-reader endpoint, which accepts a functionName parameter and directly interpolates it into a JavaScript code template without sanitization or validation. Because the attacker-controlled value is used to generate executable JavaScript, an authenticated user with only basic access can inject arbitrary JavaScript that runs on the server with the full privileges of the DbGate Node.js process. The issue also bypasses the intended require=null sandbox restriction, making the code-generation path effectively unsafe for unprivileged authenticated users.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Small PoC repository with 2 files: a README documenting CVE-2026-48017 in DbGate and a single Python exploit script at poc/rce_loadreader_functionname_injection.py. The exploit is a standalone Python requests-based authenticated RCE PoC, not tied to a larger exploitation framework. It targets DbGate's POST /runners/load-reader endpoint, where attacker-controlled functionName is interpolated into a JavaScript template executed in a forked runner process. The script optionally authenticates via POST /auth/login to obtain a JWT, then sends JSON containing a malicious functionName and empty props object. The injected JavaScript uses process.binding("spawn_sync") to bypass the intended require=null sandbox and launch /bin/sh -c <command>, enabling arbitrary command execution on the server. Repository purpose is clearly offensive validation / defender reproduction of the vulnerability rather than detection only. The code is operational because it accepts a user-supplied command and can either use an existing JWT or log in first, but it is still a simple PoC rather than a weaponized framework module.
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