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CVE-2026-48020 is a high-severity authentication and authorization bypass in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware. A request containing dot-dot path segments, including percent-encoded representations, can be selected by a public router during route matching. After StripPrefix removes the public prefix, path normalization can resolve the request to a resource associated with a separate protected router. Because authentication is evaluated on the initially selected public route, the request can reach a protected backend resource without the authentication or authorization middleware configured for the protected route.
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This repository is a self-contained proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-48020, a Traefik route-level authentication bypass involving StripPrefix path normalization. The repo contains six files: a README explaining the vulnerability and reproduction steps, docker-compose.yml to launch a vulnerable Traefik v3.7.1 instance and a Python backend, dynamic.yml defining the vulnerable routing and middleware chain, backend.py implementing a simple HTTP server that exposes protected paths and echoes the normalized path it receives, and poc.py which performs unauthenticated GET probes against direct protected paths, safe public paths, and crafted bypass paths. The exploit capability is an auth bypass, not code execution by itself. It abuses the fact that Traefik routes requests based on the original path matching PathPrefix(`/api`) before StripPrefix runs, while later normalization transforms the stripped remainder '/../admin' into '/admin'. As a result, the protected router's basicAuth middleware is skipped, yet the backend receives a protected path. The PoC verifies this by checking for HTTP 200 responses and secret-bearing JSON bodies from /admin, /internal/config, and a simulated /admin/exec endpoint. Repository structure is straightforward: poc.py is the main exploit entry point; backend.py is only a demonstration target; dynamic.yml encodes the vulnerable router logic; docker-compose.yml creates a reproducible local lab. No external C2, malware behavior, persistence, or destructive actions are present. This is a legitimate PoC exploit for a web/network vulnerability.
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A vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-48020 associated in this reference with Traefik versions 3.7.0 and 3.7.3 and the /api/version endpoint. The content provides no vulnerability type, impact, exploitation, remediation, or patch-status details.
An authentication bypass vulnerability involving Traefik StripPrefix route-level path normalization affecting HPE Aruba Networking Private 5G Core versions 1.26.1.1 and prior.
An authentication bypass vulnerability described as a Traefik StripPrefix route-level auth bypass via path normalization affecting HPE Aruba Networking Private 5G Core versions 1.26.1.1 and prior.
An authentication/authorization bypass in Traefik StripPrefix middleware caused by path normalization after route matching and prefix stripping. It allows unauthenticated attackers to access backend admin or internal paths when a public PathPrefix route with StripPrefix is configured separately from protected routes.
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