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CVE-2026-48204 is an improper input-validation and access-control vulnerability in Apache Camel's camel-mongodb-gridfs component. When a mongodb-gridfs producer endpoint does not explicitly configure its operation, it selects the GridFS operation from the gridfs.operation Exchange header. The affected GridFS control headers used non-Camel-prefixed names, allowing them to pass through Camel's HTTP header filter into an Exchange. An attacker sending requests through an HTTP consumer bridged to such a producer can override the intended operation, supply object identifiers and metadata, and cause metadata to be parsed as a MongoDB document. Affected versions are 4.0.0 through versions before 4.14.8, 4.15.0 through versions before 4.18.3, and 4.19.0 through versions before 4.21.0.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a working Java/Spring Boot proof-of-concept reproducer for CVE-2026-48204, a header-injection flaw in Apache Camel's camel-mongodb-gridfs component. The exploit demonstrates that when a Camel route bridges an HTTP consumer into a mongodb-gridfs producer without explicitly setting the operation parameter, attacker-supplied HTTP headers such as gridfs.operation and gridfs.objectid survive the HTTP boundary filter and control backend GridFS actions. Repository structure is small and purpose-built: Application.java starts the Spring Boot app; VictimRoute.java defines the vulnerable Camel route from platform-http:/upload to mongodb-gridfs:mongoClient?database=testdb&bucket=fs; MongoConfig.java creates the MongoDB client and defines database/bucket constants; GridFsHarness.java seeds and verifies a protected GridFS file; ExploitController.java contains the active exploit logic and exposes /exploit/attack to run the attack chain; Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml provide a reproducible environment with MongoDB 7 and the app; application.properties configures port 8080 and logging. Main exploit capability: the controller sends POST requests to the victim upload endpoint at http://127.0.0.1:8080/upload. First it performs a normal upload, then it injects gridfs.operation=listAll to enumerate all files in the GridFS bucket and extract the ObjectId of the protected file, and finally injects gridfs.operation=remove plus gridfs.objectid=<leaked id> to delete that file. The README also notes additional possible abuse including findOne for file reads and gridfs.metadata for MongoDB document/NoSQL-style injection. This is not merely a detector or README-only repository; it is an operational local reproducer that actively exploits the vulnerable route and proves unauthorized enumeration and deletion of GridFS content over HTTP.
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