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Apache Camel camel-irc improperly accepted non-Camel-prefixed IRC control headers from inbound HTTP requests. In vulnerable HTTP-to-IRC bridge routes, the IRC producer honored the attacker-supplied irc.sendTo Exchange header, overriding the IRC endpoint's configured channel list and sending the message solely to an attacker-selected IRC user or channel. Other IRC control headers were similarly exposed because the HTTP header filtering strategy blocked Camel-prefixed headers but did not block the legacy irc.* namespace. Affected versions are 4.0.0 through 4.14.7, 4.15.0 through 4.18.2, and 4.19.0 through 4.20.x.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a self-contained Java/Spring Boot proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-49097 in Apache Camel's camel-irc component. It demonstrates a header-injection flaw where the non-Camel-prefixed header irc.sendTo is accepted from inbound HTTP requests and used by IrcProducer to override the IRC endpoint's configured channel list. The practical impact is message redirection: content intended for an internal IRC channel can be sent to an attacker-controlled channel or nick, enabling information disclosure and bot impersonation. Repository structure is small and focused. Application.java is the Spring Boot entry point. VictimRoute.java defines the vulnerable Camel route from platform-http:/notify to an irc: endpoint configured for #alerts. ExploitController.java is the attacker driver and main exploit logic: it exposes GET /exploit/attack, sends one benign POST to /notify, then a second POST with the injected irc.sendTo header, and reports whether the destination changed to #exfil-channel. IrcRecorder.java stores the last observed IRC target and message. RecordingIRCConnection.java subclasses the real irclib IRCConnection and overrides send() to capture PRIVMSG target/text instead of using a live socket. RecordingIrcComponent.java and IrcComponentConfig.java register a custom irc component that still exercises Camel's real IrcProducer logic while avoiding any external IRC dependency. The exploit is operational rather than just a detector: it actively triggers the vulnerable route and proves redirection by observing the resulting IRC PRIVMSG target. No shellcode or OS-level payload is involved; the payload is an attacker-supplied HTTP header. The included Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml package the app as a single service listening on port 8080. application.properties configures the local server and Camel runtime. Overall, the repository's purpose is to reproduce and validate the vulnerability mechanics in a controlled environment without contacting a real IRC network.
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