Loading vulnerability…
Gogs before 0.14.3 improperly sanitizes organization names supplied through its API. Path-traversal sequences in an organization name are incorporated into repository filesystem path construction, permitting repositories to be created and accessed outside the configured repository root. An attacker can use nested Git repository structures to alter a repository hook configuration, then trigger that hook through a Git push, resulting in arbitrary command execution under the Gogs service account.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository contains a single Python2 exploit script, a short README, and a license. The script targets Gogs and implements an authenticated web-to-RCE chain for the claimed CVE-2026-52813. Workflow: it normalizes the supplied target URL, fingerprints the instance by checking the root page for 'Gogs', retrieves a CSRF token from /user/login, logs in with provided credentials, generates a path traversal organization name pointing to /var/lib/gogs/repos/admin/demo/.git, creates that malicious organization via /org/create, creates a repository under the crafted path via /org/<org_name>/new, then initializes a local Git repo and writes a malicious update hook containing a bash payload. It attempts to push this repository to <target>/<org_name>/codeb0ss_hooks.git so that the hook lands in the traversed server-side repository path and executes. Successful exploitation is indicated by creation of /tmp/codeb0ss_pwned.txt containing output of 'id' and a marker string. The exploit is operational but basic: payload and target repository path are hardcoded, there is no robust verification beyond expected HTTP responses, and no post-exploitation channel beyond writing a proof file. The code uses requests, regex CSRF extraction, subprocess Git commands, and temporary directories. It is clearly exploit code rather than a detector.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.