CVE-2026-52832 is an unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability in the Nuclio Dashboard API. The flaw is associated with handling of the function specification field spec.handler, where insufficient validation of handler-derived paths allows traversal outside the intended directory boundary during the build or source-file creation workflow. By supplying crafted path elements in spec.handler, a remote attacker can cause the Dashboard to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations accessible to the Dashboard process. Because the Dashboard process runs as root in the affected deployment context, the vulnerability can result in high-impact arbitrary file write within the container and create conditions for broader compromise.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Small PoC repository with 3 files: LICENSE, README.md, and a single Bash exploit script at poc/poc.sh. The repository targets CVE-2026-52832 / GHSA-wpcj-rmv4-86qg in Nuclio Dashboard <= 1.15.27. The exploit abuses unauthenticated POST /api/functions when Dashboard runs in default NOP auth mode. By supplying a crafted spec.handler traversal string and base64 content in spec.build.functionSourceCode, the attacker causes the Dashboard build process to write arbitrary content to a chosen path outside the build temp directory, as root, inside the container filesystem. The Bash script is operational rather than just demonstrative: it accepts a target base URL and container name, optionally creates a project via POST /api/projects, constructs a malicious JSON body, sends it to POST /api/functions, then polls using local docker exec to verify that the marker file was created in /tmp. The verification step is local-only and not part of the remote exploit path. No RCE payload is included; the capability demonstrated is arbitrary file write. The README provides lab setup for vulnerable and patched Docker images, expected behavior, impact, and remediation guidance.
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