CVE-2026-53361 is a race condition in the Linux kernel's AF_UNIX garbage-collection logic. The flaw arises because unix_gc() could execute while the gc_in_progress state is false when garbage collection work is scheduled concurrently by multiple threads. In the described sequence, overlapping calls to unix_schedule_gc() can queue multiple garbage-collection work items, allowing a later unix_gc() invocation to run after an earlier one has already cleared the flag. This breaks the assumption relied upon by unix_peek_fpl(), which uses gc_in_progress to avoid confusing garbage collection during MSG_PEEK handling. The upstream fix sets gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc() itself so the flag correctly reflects active garbage-collection execution.
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This repository is a full local Linux kernel privilege-escalation exploit for CVE-2026-53361, an AF_UNIX garbage-collector use-after-free reachable by an unprivileged user and described as container-escapable. It is not a framework module; it is a standalone C exploit with multiple support libraries and a Makefile that builds a static `exploit` binary. Repository structure: the codebase is split into focused components. `race.c/.h` implements the AF_UNIX socket graph, MSG_PEEK race, oracle logic, and timing calibration hooks. `lib_slubfw.c/.h` provides a reusable SLUB/skbuff grooming framework using loopback UDP sockets to shape allocator state and reclaim freed slab pages. `xattr.c/.h` manages tmpfs-backed `simple_xattr` sprays/resprays for kmalloc-cg-4k reclaim and leak phases. `lib_fault.c/.h` builds fault-controlled recvmsg/iovec mappings used to stall and synchronize the race. `dirtypt.c/.h` implements the post-UAF Dirty-Pagetable primitive: reclaiming a freed pipe-backed page as a leaf page table, then using partial pipe reads/writes to capture and forge PTEs for physical memory read/write. `pagemap*.c/.h` walk 4-level or 5-level page tables and bootstrap kernel address translation. `offset.c/.h` resolves kernel structure offsets from `/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux` or fallback tables. `kallsysms.c/.h` parses in-kernel kallsyms from a physical dump to resolve symbols like `core_pattern`, `commit_creds`, and `avc_denied`. `shell.c/.h` contains the post-exploitation payload that plants a core_pattern handler and relays a root shell over AF_UNIX. `sstd.c/.h` is a stochastic optimizer used to search timing windows for the race. Main exploit capability: the exploit races AF_UNIX garbage collection against `MSG_PEEK` to free a still-referenced socket/sk_buff, then uses heap grooming and reclaim techniques to turn the UAF into controlled kernel object overlap. From there it constructs a fake pipe/file/sk_buff state, frees and reclaims a pipe page, and converts that into a page-table corruption primitive. With the resulting physical read/write, it self-maps the reclaimed leaf page table, discovers kernel base and symbols, overwrites `core_pattern`, and optionally disables SELinux by patching `avc_denied`. Finally it crashes a child process so the kernel executes the planted core handler as root in init namespaces, which connects back to a per-run UNIX socket and spawns `/bin/bash -i` or `/bin/sh -i`. Notable targeting details: README explicitly targets Linux 6.12-based kernels up to 6.12.94, Ubuntu 24.04 HWE 6.17 up to 6.17.0-41, RHEL 10 6.12-based kernels, and Debian trixie 6.12 builds. It states Ubuntu 24.04 GA 6.8 is vulnerable but not covered by this single-vector MSG_PEEK exploit. The exploit is intended for low CPU-count systems and relies on BTF availability by default. Overall, this is a real, advanced, operational local kernel exploit with a built-in root-shell payload, not merely a detector or proof-of-concept stub.
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