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CVE-2026-53694 is an argument injection vulnerability in NoMachine caused by improper neutralization of argument delimiters in a command. The issue affects NoMachine versions prior to 9.5.7 and prior to 8.23.2. Based on the available information, attacker-controlled input can be incorporated into a command invocation without sufficient sanitization of argument separators, allowing unintended arguments to be passed to the target command.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a README and a single Python PoC (poc.py) for CVE-2026-53694, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in NoMachine on Linux. The exploit abuses improper argument handling in the root-run script /usr/NX/scripts/restricted/nxchmod.sh, which passes attacker-controlled file names directly to chmod. By creating a crafted filename containing injected flags (e.g., '-R -L') inside /tmp/.X11-unix/ and placing a symlink to /etc/passwd beneath the corresponding directory, the attacker causes chmod to recursively follow the symlink and change /etc/passwd permissions to 0666. The Python script then appends a hardcoded UID 0 user entry ('gg') to /etc/passwd, yielding root access via su. The code structure is simple: helper functions verify Wayland/XWayland presence, generate a unique X11-style path name, and poll for permission changes indicating nxchmod.sh has run. The main routine creates the malicious file and directory layout, waits for the chmod cycle, writes the root account entry, and removes some filesystem artifacts. This is a real exploit rather than a detector, and it is operational because it includes a complete hardcoded privilege-escalation payload. No network communication is present; the attack vector is purely local and filesystem-based.
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