Unrated

Unauthenticated SSRF in Dragonfly Scheduler DownloadTinyFile

IdentifiersCVE-2026-54637CWE-918

CVE-2026-54637 is an unauthenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Dragonfly scheduler v1 and v2. According to the provided advisory, the issue is in the scheduler v1 gRPC DownloadTinyFile path, where attacker-controlled PeerHost values can cause the scheduler to initiate server-side HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal addresses. The response data from those requests can then be stored in Task.DirectPiece. The vulnerable logic is associated with scheduler/resource/standard/peer.go, and the recommended fix is to use nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext in the HTTP transport for DownloadTinyFile. The advisory also notes that additional validation in storeHost to reject non-global-unicast addresses is advisable.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

A remote unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the scheduler gRPC service can coerce the scheduler into making HTTP requests to attacker-selected internal or otherwise restricted destinations. This enables blind probing of internal HTTP services and limited data exfiltration from reachable internal endpoints. Per the advisory, up to 128 bytes per task can be exfiltrated through Task.DirectPiece. Depending on network placement, this may expose internal service metadata, cloud instance metadata, administrative interfaces, or other sensitive HTTP-accessible resources.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until a fixed version is deployed, restrict access to the scheduler gRPC service to trusted clients only. Enable TLS and authentication on the scheduler interface where supported. Constrain outbound network access from the scheduler to prevent connections to loopback, link-local, RFC1918/internal ranges where not required, cloud metadata endpoints, and other sensitive internal destinations. As defense in depth, validate or reject non-global-unicast PeerHost IP values before they are accepted or used in request generation.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade d7y.io/dragonfly/v2 to version 2.4.4-rc.3 or later. Apply the code-level fix in scheduler/resource/standard/peer.go so that the HTTP transport used by DownloadTinyFile uses nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext. Additionally, implement validation in storeHost or equivalent input-handling paths to reject non-global-unicast PeerHost addresses before they are persisted or used.

PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

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0 SOURCESView more in app

No public activity observed for this vulnerability.

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Threat actor evidence

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Associated malware

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Detection signatures

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Social activity