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Yamcs before versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2 contains a code-injection flaw in StreamSQL aggregate-expression compilation. A user permitted to control archiving can create a double-quoted column identifier whose content is insufficiently sanitized before it is incorporated into generated Java source. When a query using a sum aggregate is compiled, Janino compiles the attacker-influenced Java in the Yamcs server JVM, enabling arbitrary Java execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python proof-of-concept script plus supporting documentation and captured evidence for CVE-2026-55511, an authenticated Yamcs StreamSQL Java code-injection vulnerability. The repo structure is small: one executable file (poc.py), three Markdown documents (README, vulnerability report, patch analysis), and two evidence artifacts. The PoC is intentionally non-weaponized and does not attack a live server. Instead, it analyzes a local Yamcs source checkout to confirm the vulnerable chain: TableApi.executeSql -> permissive double-quoted identifier parsing in StreamSql.jj -> unsafe identifier construction in Expression.java -> aggregate compilation in SumExpression/CompilableAggregateExpression via Janino SimpleCompiler. It then generates a local Java model that mirrors the vulnerable aggregate code-generation pattern and demonstrates statement injection by setting a harmless JVM property marker. Main exploit capability: authenticated RCE-class Java code execution in the Yamcs server JVM if a real vulnerable target is reached through POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql with ControlArchiving privileges. However, the included code itself is primarily a validation/demo PoC rather than an operational exploit: no network communication, no credential handling, no live target interaction, and no OS command execution. Fingerprintable targets and observables include the executeSql API path, Yamcs source file paths checked by the script, example SQL statements used to trigger the aggregate path, and the benign marker property YAMCS_YARCH_SQL_POC. Overall, this is a credible PoC repository documenting and safely demonstrating the vulnerability mechanics and upstream patch rationale.
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