flyto-core contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in multiple HTTP-capable modules that issue outbound requests to fully user-controlled URLs without invoking the project's SSRF validation routine, validate_url_with_env_config. The flaw affects modules that perform direct HTTP requests while relying only on non-enforcing metadata indicating SSRF protection rather than actually applying destination validation before network access. Reported affected modules include core.api.http_get, core.api.http_post, GraphQL request modules, monitoring and notification modules, certain AI and browser-related modules, and inline base_url handling paths. The root cause is an inconsistent, per-module SSRF protection model with no centralized guarded outbound HTTP client, allowing vulnerable modules to bypass intended destination restrictions entirely. Successful exploitation allows an authenticated workflow author to direct the application to access loopback, RFC1918, cloud metadata, and other internal network resources and receive the remote response content back through the application.
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No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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