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CVE-2026-57062 is an improper input-validation vulnerability in CMS parsing by GnuPG gpgsm through version 2.5.20. When processing AES-GCM CMS content, gpgsm accepts a 4-byte aes-ICVlen authentication-tag length even though the CMS format requires a 12-byte length. This incorrect validation can cause malformed AES-GCM CMS messages to be accepted and can undermine message-integrity verification.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This four-file repository is an Exploitmatic proof of concept for CVE-2026-57062 / USN-8720-1. Its sole executable artifact, `gpgsm-cve-2026-57062-cms-gcm-short-tag.txt`, is an Exploitmatic process-definition file rather than conventional source code. It connects over SSH to a configured target, exports the target's public S/MIME recipient certificate with `gpgsm --export`, then uses the runtime `cmsgcm` transform to produce AES-256-GCM CMS AuthEnvelopedData messages with both a normal 12-byte tag and a non-compliant 4-byte tag. The baseline process verifies ordinary decryption; the short-tag process verifies whether gpgsm improperly authenticates and releases the forged plaintext. The repository contains no standalone malware, credential, persistence, or RCE functionality. README documentation states that stock gpgsm 2.4.4 accepted the short tag, while Ubuntu's patched gnupg2 2.4.4-2ubuntu17.6 rejected it. Supporting files are the README, Apache-2.0 license, and Git attributes configuration.
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