Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2026-58455 is a critical unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability affecting Dockwatch through version 0.6.567. The flaw arises from two combined weaknesses: an incomplete authentication flow in loader.php caused by a missing exit() after an authentication redirect, and unsanitized user-controlled input being passed to shell_exec() in ajax/compose.php. By leveraging the incomplete authentication check, a remote attacker can establish the required session state and then supply crafted input to the composePath POST parameter in the composePull action, resulting in arbitrary shell command execution on the host running Dockwatch. In typical deployments, exposure is further amplified because the application commonly operates with access to the Docker socket, increasing the likelihood of full host compromise.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, focused proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-58455 affecting Notifiarr Dockwatch through version 0.6.567. The repo contains one executable Python script (dockwatch_rce_poc.py), a README describing the vulnerability chain and usage, and a .gitignore. The Python code is standalone and uses only the standard library. The exploit chains three issues described in the README and reflected in the script logic: (1) a session-priming request to /includes/header.php sets the IN_DOCKWATCH session flag without authentication, (2) an authentication bypass condition caused by loader.php redirecting unauthenticated users without terminating execution, and (3) command injection in /ajax/compose.php when the composePull action concatenates attacker-controlled composePath into a shell command. The script first fingerprints the target by requesting the root page and checking for Dockwatch in the HTML title/body, then primes the session, then sends a POST request to /ajax/compose.php with m=composePull and a composePath payload of the form '; <command> 2>&1 #'. Its main capability is unauthenticated remote command execution against a vulnerable Dockwatch instance, with reflected command output parsed from the HTTP response to confirm exploitation. The default command is 'id', but the operator can supply arbitrary commands via --command. The script also stores a local JSON result summary in poc_result.json. Because the README notes that many deployments mount /var/run/docker.sock into the container, successful code execution may enable escalation from container context to effective host compromise. Repository structure is minimal and purposeful: README.md documents root cause, usage, lab reproduction, and remediation; dockwatch_rce_poc.py implements the exploit workflow; .gitignore excludes Python cache files and the generated JSON output. This is a real exploit PoC rather than a detection-only script.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability affecting Dockwatch versions 0.6.567 and earlier.
A critical unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in Dockwatch through version 0.6.567 that can allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands and achieve full host compromise.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.