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CVE-2026-58457 is a critical unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater, hardware model MT02. The flaw is in the commuos web backend, specifically the smacfilter_conf handler. User-controlled GET parameters name, enable, and mac are incorporated without sanitization into uci shell command strings using sprintf(), and those commands are then executed via doSystemCmdComlib(). By appending semicolon-delimited shell payloads to one of the vulnerable parameters, a network-adjacent attacker can cause arbitrary operating system commands to be executed on the device. Because the commands run in the device context with root privileges, successful exploitation results in full compromise of the repeater.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a real exploit set for CVE-2026-58457, an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater (MT02). Because the repository includes a Metasploit module, the primary exploit file is aitemi_m300_smacfilter_rce.rb. That module is a weaponized Metasploit exploit using Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient and Msf::Exploit::CmdStager. It targets the device’s web interface on port 80 by default, optionally over SSL, and attempts injection through the GET parameters name, enable, or mac. The injected payload format is ;<cmd>;, and the module iterates across four candidate paths: /goform/smacfilter_conf, /form/smacfilter_conf, /smacfilter_conf, and /apply.cgi. The check routine uses a harmless id command and marks the target vulnerable if the HTTP response contains uid/gid output. Exploitation supports two modes: direct Unix command execution and staged Linux MIPSBE payload delivery via CmdStager, indicating practical post-exploitation capability beyond a simple proof of concept. Repository structure beyond the Metasploit module includes poc.py, a standalone Python exploit that performs the same unauthenticated GET-based command injection over HTTP/HTTPS with retries and optional callback-based output exfiltration using curl or wget; val.py, a passive validator that checks for vulnerability using id and response matching; gen.py, a payload generator that creates obfuscated command-injection strings using URL encoding, double encoding, base64, hex, IFS substitution, subshells, backticks, eval, printf, and randomized separators; plus README.md and MITIGATIONS.md for usage and defensive guidance. Overall, the repository’s purpose is to provide offensive testing and validation tooling for this router/repeater RCE, with both framework-integrated and standalone exploit paths.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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