CVE-2026-60093 is a relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel's camel-azure-storage-datalake component. The downloadToFile operation constructed a local download target by joining the configured download directory with an Azure Data Lake path name supplied by the remote listing, without lexical normalization or validation that the resolved target remained within the configured directory. The consumer accepted listed path names without filtering by default, enabling parent-directory segments in attacker-influenced remote names to escape the intended local download boundary. Affected versions are Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.14.8, 4.15.0 through 4.18.3, and 4.19.0 through 4.21.x.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains two runnable Java proof-of-concept reproducers for CVE-2026-60093 in Apache Camel's camel-azure-storage-datalake component: a Spring Boot variant and a Quarkus variant. Both variants are self-contained and expose an HTTP endpoint on port 8080 that triggers the vulnerable DataLakeFileOperations.downloadToFile code path. Rather than interacting with a live Azure Data Lake Gen2 service, each app directly instantiates DataLakeFileOperations with a stub DataLakeFileClientWrapper whose getFileName() returns an attacker-controlled path and whose downloadToFileWithResponse() writes content to the supplied local path. This accurately reproduces the vulnerable behavior where Camel constructs the destination as new File(fileDir, fileName) without normalization or containment checks. The exploit capability is arbitrary file write outside the configured directory /app/downloads by using a malicious remote filename ../../../../../../tmp/pwned-60093.txt, resulting in a write to /tmp/pwned-60093.txt. Repository structure: top-level README explains the CVE, affected/fixed versions, and usage; camel-spring-boot/ contains a standard Spring Boot app with Application.java, DataLakeTraversalDriver.java, ExploitController.java, Dockerfile, docker-compose, and properties; camel-quarkus/ mirrors the same logic with ExploitResource.java and Quarkus packaging. This is a legitimate educational exploit/reproducer, not merely a detector, and its payload is benign marker content proving traversal-based file write.
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