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CVE-2026-61946 is an unauthenticated insecure direct object reference vulnerability affecting Easy Appointments versions up to and including 3.12.27. The flaw allows direct access to application objects or records through insufficient authorization checks on object references. Because the issue is unauthenticated, a remote attacker can interact with vulnerable object identifiers without first establishing a valid session, potentially reaching data or functions that should be restricted.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-61946, an unauthenticated insecure direct object reference in the WordPress Easy Appointments plugin. The exploit abuses the public AJAX reservation handler by supplying an attacker-controlled appointment primary key via the id parameter. Instead of creating a new booking, affected versions can route the request into the database replace path and overwrite an existing appointment row. Repository structure is simple and focused: README.md documents the vulnerability, exploitation flow, impact, and references; poc/reproduce.ps1 and poc/reproduce.sh are the only executable files and serve as PowerShell and Bash/curl reproducers; evidence/sample-before-after.txt contains sanitized proof of overwrite behavior; patch/fix.diff shows the upstream fix that removes client control over the id field. The exploit capability is booking tampering rather than code execution. It can modify customer name, email, phone, description, location, service, worker, date, and start time for an existing appointment, provided the attacker knows or guesses a valid appointment ID and chooses valid public scheduling values. Both PoCs default to dry-run mode and require explicit safety flags before sending the request. The main fingerprintable target is the WordPress endpoint /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=ea_res_appointment. No authentication, cookies, or WordPress account are required according to the repository documentation. Overall, this is a real operational PoC for integrity-impacting unauthorized record overwrite, not merely a detector or write-up.
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