CVE-2026-6330 is an implementation flaw in wolfSSL’s ARM64 NEON ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext-comparison path. An ARM64 assembly instruction error used ins where ext was intended, causing the constant-time comparison used during Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption validation to examine only approximately half of the ciphertext. Of the 1,568-byte ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, 784 bytes can remain unchecked. Consequently, modifications to unchecked ciphertext material may not trigger the mandatory implicit-rejection behavior during decapsulation, violating the intended Fujisaki-Okamoto security construction and weakening IND-CCA2 security. The flaw affects wolfSSL versions 5.7.4 through 5.9.1 in applicable ARM64 NEON builds with ML-KEM enabled.
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This repository is a real exploit/research repo for two wolfSSL ML-KEM-1024 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-10097 (x86-64 AVX2) and CVE-2026-6330 (ARM64 NEON). Its purpose is not remote intrusion in the classic sense, but practical cryptographic key recovery from a vulnerable decapsulation oracle. The core capability is to exploit incomplete ciphertext comparison in wolfSSL’s Fujisaki-Okamoto implicit-rejection logic so that tampered ciphertexts are accepted if modifications fall in unchecked regions. The Python recovery harnesses then vary unchecked compressed v-coefficients, observe oracle output, reconstruct decryption-noise-related measurements, and solve a linear regression problem to recover the secret ML-KEM key coefficients. Repository structure is split into two parallel subtrees: avx2-cve-2026-10097/ and neon-cve-2026-6330/. Each contains README/reproduction docs, a C oracle implementation, a C sweep tool to identify unchecked ciphertext positions, and Python scripts for simulation, validation, and live recovery. The AVX2 subtree is the more complete analytical path, including RECOVERY_ANALYSIS.md and scripts verify_compressed.py, regress_compressed.py, test_harness.py, and live_recover_avx2.py. The NEON subtree mirrors the live attack flow with predict_unchecked.py, regress_neon.py, validate_neon.py, live_recover_neon.py, and a Dockerfile for ARM64/QEMU reproduction. Main exploit behavior: - wolf_oracle.c creates a persistent local ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation oracle using vulnerable wolfSSL code, exports public/private keys for scoring, and accepts ciphertexts over stdin. - sweep_implicit_reject.c and sweep_neon_fo.c confirm which ciphertext bytes are not checked by decapsulation. - live_recover_avx2.py and live_recover_neon.py perform the end-to-end attack by generating ciphertexts, modifying unchecked v-coefficients, querying the oracle repeatedly, deriving regression targets, and solving for the secret key. - regress_compressed.py and regress_neon.py simulate the same recovery offline against kyber-py models. - validate_neon.py is a lighter live validation script for the NEON case. Targeting details extracted from the code/docs: - Product: wolfSSL ML-KEM-1024 implementation before 5.9.2. - AVX2 bug: only bytes 1536-1567 of the 1568-byte ciphertext are unchecked, corresponding to v-coefficients 205-255. - NEON bug: approximately half the ciphertext is unchecked; predicted/validated v-coefficient bands are [52-101], [154-203], and [231-255]. - Reproduction uses pre-fix wolfSSL commit d278da09d. This is operational exploit code rather than mere detection: it includes a working oracle, live attack harnesses, and documented recovery results showing high-percentage or full recovery of ML-KEM secret coefficients under the stated conditions.
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