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CVE-2026-63643 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in MagicMirror² before version 2.37.0. The calendar module's ADD_CALENDAR Socket.IO handler accepts attacker-controlled request locations, authentication data, and a setting that permits self-signed TLS certificates without authentication. It passes these values to CalendarFetcher without validating the destination or restricting access to internal resources. If the fetched response is valid iCalendar data, parsed calendar events are returned to the attacker; otherwise, the behavior still supports blind SSRF and timing-based probing.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This three-file JavaScript proof-of-concept repository contains a README and two standalone Node.js Socket.IO clients. Both scripts connect to a configurable MagicMirror² target's /calendar Socket.IO namespace and emit ADD_CALENDAR with a controlled URL, aiming to make the Calendar module fetch a network resource from the server's own trust boundary. cve-2026-63642.js is a basic configurable SSRF trigger using MM and SSRF_URL environment variables, logs all Socket.IO events, and flags CALENDAR_EVENTS as success. cve-2026-63643.js is an extended variant with a hard-coded http://attack destination; it requests high event/day limits, enables broadcastPastEvents and selfSignedCert, and prints returned calendar-event metadata for potential internal iCal data disclosure. No established exploit framework is used, no shell or command-execution payload is present, and the payload behavior is limited to SSRF and potential calendar-content exfiltration.
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