A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel posix CPU timers subsystem arises from a race between timer deletion or timer setup paths and a non-leader exec() that changes the thread-group leader. In the affected logic, timer operations can resolve a task reference based on the old leader, then observe the task's signal-handling state as cleared during leader switch and exit processing, causing the operation to return without properly synchronizing with timer inheritance and cleanup. If a thread-group-targeted POSIX CPU timer is armed and enqueued, exec()-time inheritance can leave timerqueue state reachable after the underlying POSIX timer object has been freed. Subsequent timer expiration handling or timerqueue add/delete activity can then dereference the freed timerqueue node, resulting in a kernel use-after-free. Related effects described for the same race include failure to rearm timers and a similar unsafe condition in the CPU nanosleep path. The upstream fix adds stronger memory-ordering semantics around signal-handling teardown and changes task lookup and sighand locking so that a transient NULL sighand during leader transition causes retry rather than premature success or silent return.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, focused proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-64560, a Linux kernel use-after-free race in posix CPU timers caused by non-leader exec() interacting with timer deletion/set/rearm paths. The repo contains 5 files: a detailed README, the upstream kernel fix patch, and a poc/ directory with one C source file plus Linux/Android build files. The main executable logic is in poc/cve_2026_64560_poc.c. The PoC is a local race trigger, not a full privilege-escalation exploit. Its core capability is to stress the vulnerable kernel path by running two concurrent activities: (1) timer threads repeatedly create, arm, briefly exercise, and delete CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID timers; and (2) exec threads repeatedly fork child processes where a non-leader pthread calls execve() on /bin/true (Linux) or /system/bin/true (Android). This is specifically designed to hit the window where pid_task() resolves the old thread-group leader while its sighand has just been cleared during de_thread()/__exit_signal(), causing the timer object to be freed while still queued in the process CPU timer rbtree. If the race lands on an unpatched kernel, subsequent timerqueue operations or run_posix_cpu_timers() may dereference the freed k_itimer, producing KASAN use-after-free reports, warnings, panic, or instability. The code includes a --check mode that verifies basic prerequisites by creating a CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID timer, checking the exec target path, and reading /proc/version. There is no network communication, no command-and-control behavior, and no payload for code execution or persistence. The included patch file documents the upstream fix strategy, including timer_lock_sighand() and memory-ordering changes in __exit_signal()/lock_task_sighand().
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