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CVE-2026-64705 is a buffer overflow in Apple operating systems. Insufficient bounds checking allows an application to trigger unexpected system termination or write to kernel memory. Apple addressed the issue by improving bounds checking in iOS 26.6, iPadOS 26.6, macOS Sequoia 15.7.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8.7, and macOS Tahoe 26.6.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This five-file repository contains a Python proof-of-concept builder and parser plus Markdown build and root-cause documentation for CVE-2026-64705. weaponize.py is the primary exploit entry point: it reads base.dmg, discovers the HFS+ volume header and Attributes B-tree offsets, verifies a single expected ForkData record for file ID 18 / bigattr, then patches its total block count and inline extent descriptors. It appends a crafted HFSPlusAttrExtents (type 0x30) record with eight oversized block counts and writes poc-cve-2026-64705.dmg. On affected HFS implementations, a subsequent getxattr/listxattr operation on the mounted trigger file enters an overflow-extent traversal in which the counted block total remains zero, causing repeated attacker-controlled copies beyond a 512-byte kernel allocation. parse_attr.py is a supporting Attributes B-tree parser/dumper that can also create a separate integer-wrap test image when invoked with --patch. BUILD.md and README.md provide image construction and triggering steps, while WRITEUP.md compares the pre-fix and fixed logic and notes the patch's carry, zero-total, and bounds validations. No network communication, hard-coded remote host, C2, shell payload, or persistence mechanism is present; delivery is via a malicious local HFS+ image, potentially downloaded or supplied on removable media.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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