CVE-2026-65694 is a path traversal vulnerability in Microweber CMS through version 2.0.20. The flaw is present in the static file controller, where attacker-controlled input supplied through the path query parameter is not safely normalized. Specifically, the path handling logic fails to remove directory traversal sequences during normalize_path() processing, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to traverse outside the intended directory and access arbitrary files on the underlying server via a single crafted HTTP GET request. The issue can expose application configuration data and other local files that should not be reachable through the web application.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Small standalone Python PoC repository for CVE-2026-65694 affecting Microweber CMS. The repository contains one primary code file, poc.py, plus README, license, and requirements. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. poc.py uses the requests library to send crafted GET requests to the public Microweber route /userfiles/{path}, abusing the application's use of the request property 'path' so that a query parameter overrides the route segment. By supplying traversal sequences in ?path=, the script reads arbitrary files outside the intended userfiles directory. The code includes URL normalization, redirect handling, optional proxy support, retries, disabled TLS verification, random route segments, multiple traversal encodings for bypass attempts, and automatic traversal-depth discovery. It supports three operator actions: vulnerability check, read file to stdout, and download file to disk. The README clearly documents the root cause, affected versions, example requests, impact, and remediation. Overall, this is an operational arbitrary-file-read exploit focused on unauthenticated data exfiltration rather than code execution.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.