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CVE-2026-66906 is a relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel's camel-azure-storage-blob component. In affected versions, the downloadBlobToFile operation constructs a local download path by joining the configured fileDir with an Azure Blob name without lexical normalization or verification that the resulting path remains within fileDir. The consumer enumerates blob names from its configured container and processes them without default name filtering. An attacker who can influence a consumed container's blob names can use parent-directory segments to cause the Camel process to create or overwrite files outside the intended download directory.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a runnable proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-66906 affecting Apache Camel's camel-azure-storage-blob consumer. It contains two self-contained implementations of the same exploit scenario: camel-spring-boot/ using Spring Boot 3.5.13 with Camel 4.18.2, and camel-quarkus/ using Quarkus 3.36.0 / Camel Quarkus 3.36.0 bundling Camel 4.20.0. Both versions are explicitly identified as vulnerable. Core exploit capability: the code demonstrates a path traversal leading to arbitrary file write. The vulnerable Camel consumer downloads every blob from a container into a configured local directory via fileDir=/app/downloads, but constructs the destination path by joining fileDir with the remote blob name without normalization or containment checks. By seeding a blob named ../../../../../../tmp/pwned-66906.txt, the consumer writes outside /app/downloads and creates /tmp/pwned-66906.txt. Repository structure: each variant includes a Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, Maven pom.xml, application code, and a variant-specific README. The Spring Boot variant uses Application.java as the app entry point, BlobConfig.java to configure the BlobServiceClient and seed the Azurite container, VictimRoute.java for the vulnerable Camel route, and ExploitController.java to report exploitation success. The Quarkus variant uses BlobClientProducer.java to expose the BlobServiceClient, Seeder.java to seed the container at startup, VictimRoute.java for the vulnerable route, and ExploitResource.java as the observation endpoint. Operational flow: docker-compose starts Azurite and the vulnerable app; startup code creates or opens the victim-container and uploads both a benign blob (report.txt) and the traversal-named blob; the Camel azure-storage-blob consumer polls the container and downloads blobs to /app/downloads; due to the flaw, the malicious blob escapes to /tmp/pwned-66906.txt; the HTTP endpoint /exploit/attack waits briefly, lists files in /app/downloads, and confirms whether the out-of-directory file exists and contains the marker text. This is a real exploit PoC rather than a scanner or detection-only script. It does not deliver a shell or remote code execution payload; instead it provides a controlled arbitrary file write demonstration against affected Camel deployments that consume attacker-influenced blob names.
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