Rouille versions 0.3.3 through 3.6.2 contain an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability in the forwarding of client-supplied request headers to upstream connections. Header values containing bare line feed characters (0x0A) are copied verbatim without validation. An attacker can embed a complete additional HTTP request in a header value, which compatible upstream backends, including Go net/http and Python http.server, interpret as a separate request. This enables attacker-chosen methods, paths, and headers to reach the backend without passing through the Rouille handler's access-control logic.
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No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Unknown
An HTTP request smuggling vulnerability in rouille that can enable front-end access control bypass.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.