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CVE-2026-69328 is an untrusted search path vulnerability in Windows Storage. An authorized local attacker can exploit unsafe resolution of dependencies through a search path to elevate privileges on an affected Windows system.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This four-file C proof-of-concept implements a local privilege escalation identified as CVE-2026-69328. CVE-2026-69328.c is the primary executable: it enumerates the machine PATH registry value, identifies a non-Windows directory writable by the current user, plants a companion DLL named SprintCSP.dll, and invokes a manually defined StorSvc RPC interface/procedure to induce its loading. The source contains selectable RPC interface UUIDs for Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2019, and Windows Server 2022; Windows 10 is selected by default. payload.c builds the planted DLL. Its DllMain runs synchronously on service-driven DLL load, creates a proof file under System32, executes whoami /all through cmd.exe, and records the resulting SYSTEM identity information. The executable supports setup, exploit, RPC-trigger, and cleanup modes. The setup path is explicitly administrative, while successful normal exploitation depends on a pre-existing user-writable directory in the machine-wide PATH. README.md documents GCC/MSVC build commands and notes that StorSvc may crash after DLL loading and be restarted later by the Service Control Manager. No network communication, remote target, persistence mechanism, or interactive shell is implemented.
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1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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