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CVE-2026-71294 is an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the Cotonti CMS Comments plugin. The plugin deserializes user-controlled data with PHP unserialize() after only base64 decoding and minimal input handling, without restricting instantiable classes via allowed_classes. In CreateAction.php, the ci POST parameter is imported with trim-only sanitization and passed to unserialize(base64_decode(...)); in EditAction.php, the cb parameter is processed through the same pattern in prepareComeBack(). These code paths are reachable by authenticated members who can write comments or edit their own comments under the default plugin authorization settings. The flaw creates a PHP Object Injection primitive, allowing an attacker to supply serialized objects of classes already loaded by the application. Exploitation was demonstrated using Cotonti's MySQL_cache class, where object destruction triggers a __destruct()-to-flush() chain that performs attacker-controlled database inserts. An equivalent deserialization sink also exists in DeleteAction.php, but that path is restricted to administrators.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This two-file repository contains a safe local PHP proof of concept for CWE-502 deserialization of untrusted data in Cotonti's CommentsWidget. README.md documents the reported vulnerable ci GET-parameter path, affected component, mitigation, references, and expected output. poc.php defines a DangerousGadget class, serializes and Base64-encodes it, then simulates processing through unrestricted unserialize(). The gadget's __wakeup() method only writes a temporary /tmp/pwned_by_cotonti_poc.txt sentinel and prints a message; it does not execute the placeholder 'id && whoami' command. The script additionally verifies that unserialize(..., ['allowed_classes' => false]) prevents gadget instantiation and checks rejection of an invalid decoded value shape. No network requests, remote target selection, credential handling, command execution, or persistent payload functionality is present.
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