XenForo versions before 2.3.13 contain missing authorization in the ACP force-agreement controller. The controller permits an authenticated ACP administrator to access and submit force-agreement forms without enforcing the option permission declared by the associated navigation configuration. An administrator who lacks the intended permission can therefore update the global policy last-updated timestamp.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This three-file repository contains a Python proof of concept (`poc.py`), a README describing CVE-2026-73318, and a minimal Python cache ignore file. The PoC accepts a user-supplied XenForo base URL and limited ACP username, prompts for the password, and maintains an authenticated cookie session. It extracts ACP CSRF tokens from HTML forms, logs in, checks whether the account is denied access to `/admin.php?options/`, and then invokes the privacy-policy and terms ForceAgreementController routes directly. The script classifies the target as vulnerable only when Options returns 403 while both force-agreement routes return 200 for GET and POST. Because its POST requests intentionally alter global agreement timestamps, `--confirm` is mandatory. This is a functional, state-changing authorization-bypass PoC rather than a passive detection-only script; its payload is basic and hardcoded to the two affected XenForo actions.
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