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CVE-2026-74586 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel SCTP implementation. While processing an authenticated ASCONF chunk, SCTP can add a peer transport and subsequently remove that same transport through a wildcard DEL-IP parameter. The removal path does not clear asoc->new_transport, leaving it as a dangling pointer. SCTP subsequently creates a HEARTBEAT referencing the removed transport without retaining a transport reference. If the HEARTBEAT remains queued during local-address replacement, later processing of a successful ASCONF_ACK can cause sctp_outq_select_transport() to read the state of the RCU-freed transport.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This five-file standalone C repository contains two Linux SCTP kernel vulnerability PoCs, plus a Makefile, README, and gitignore. The default Makefile target builds poc.c. The primary PoC creates an unprivileged user and network namespace, configures loopback and SCTP ASCONF sysctls, creates a local SCTP association, captures SCTP state needed for a valid forged packet, and injects a CRC32c-valid ASCONF sequence that adds and then removes the same peer address. The intended effect is a stale asoc->new_transport dereference after the transport has been removed, evidenced by a HEARTBEAT to the removed address. It is a trigger/UAF demonstration, not a privilege-escalation exploit. The separate acklock.c program builds a malformed ASCONF-ACK whose inconsistent parameter length handling causes SCTP response processing to repeatedly consume a zero length, resulting in a softirq CPU-denial-of-service condition. The README includes kernel-structure offsets and speculative post-UAF weaponization discussion, but the included code does not implement heap grooming, an information leak, indirect-call control, or an execution payload. Some serial-number guidance differs between README prose and poc.c comments, but both programs are clearly designed as local lab PoCs that forge raw SCTP traffic.
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