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CVE-2026-75616 is an OS command injection vulnerability in the web management interface of TP-Link Archer C20 v6 firmware. Insufficient validation of attacker-controlled input during certain WAN-related configuration operations allows an authenticated administrator to inject and execute arbitrary system commands with elevated privileges.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept repository containing an MIT license, a CVE-focused README, and one executable script, bpa-poc.py. It targets CVE-2026-75616, an authenticated command-injection flaw in the BPA (BigPond Cable Authentication) WAN configuration functionality of TP-Link Archer C20 v6 firmware. The script implements the router's encrypted management-session protocol: it retrieves RSA parameters from /cgi/getParm, uses manually implemented PKCS#1-style RSA encryption to protect signing material, and uses AES-CBC to encrypt requests to /cgi_gdpr. After authenticating as an administrator, it enumerates WAN_IP_CONN instances, identifies or configures a BPA WAN instance, writes an attacker-controlled BPA username containing a shell metacharacter payload, disables competing WAN connections, and cycles the BPA connection. When DHCP causes the BPA instance to become Connected, the router's BPA initialization code constructs and executes a shell command with unsanitized BPA values, yielding root command execution. The default payload starts telnetd with ash on TCP/4445, and the script polls WAN status before attempting a TCP connection to confirm the bind shell. The repository is not part of a recognized exploit framework and is an operational authenticated RCE PoC with a basic, configurable command payload.
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