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Howyar Technologies SysReturn versions before 11.3.0.34 contain a local arbitrary-code-execution vulnerability in EFI boot-component handling of attacker-controlled data on the EFI System Partition. A crafted data file processed by the affected boot component can cause execution of arbitrary code.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This 15-file repository is UEFI vulnerability research and functional proof-of-concept tooling for Howyar SysReturn NetCopy, centered on the IA-32 NetCopy boot component BOOTia32.efi. It documents that SysReturn v11.2.031 distributed the Microsoft-signed, revoked reloader.efi-derived binary associated with CVE-2024-7344, and attributes the continued IA-32 distribution to CVE-2026-79298. The repository contains manuals and vendor correspondence (00 Manual and 02 Disclosure), extracted-package inventory and boot configurations (01 Binaries), and research documentation plus three Python tools (03 Vulnerability Research/Scripts). Script00 decodes and extracts XOR-obfuscated ALRM payloads; Script01 computes PE Authenticode hashes and can compare results against known revoked hashes or the local UEFI dbx; Script02 is the exploit-enabling component, producing a correctly structured ALRM cloak file from an arbitrary EFI/PE executable. The documented BOOTia32.efi flow searches four ESP paths for cloak data, XOR-decrypts it with 0xB3, and uses a custom RxPE manual PE loader rather than Secure Boot-enforced UEFI image services. The repository is not a network exploit and does not contact command-and-control or target web services. Exploitation is boot-media/ESP based and requires a system that still accepts the revoked signed loader.
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