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CVE-2026-82876 is an improper cryptographic-signature verification vulnerability in Phison PS3111-S11 controller firmware. The firmware trusts an RSA public modulus stored in the mutable firmware image instead of anchoring the verification key in immutable storage. An attacker can create an RSA key pair, modify a firmware image, replace the embedded modulus with the attacker-controlled public modulus, and sign the altered image using the corresponding private key. The controller consequently validates and accepts the malicious firmware.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This two-file repository contains a README and a dependency-free Python 3 proof of concept, forge_signature.py, for CVE-2026-82876. The script does not communicate with drives, issue ATA commands, write firmware, or contain a deployable implant. Instead, it models the documented S11 firmware-image layout and drive-side verification logic using real pure-Python RSA-2048 PKCS#1 v1.5/SHA-256 operations. It generates a stock synthetic image, demonstrates that unsigned images are accepted, shows ordinary tampering fails if the prior signature is retained, and then generates an attacker RSA key pair, signs modified synthetic firmware, and embeds the attacker public modulus at signature-segment offset +768. Verification succeeds because the modeled verifier trusts that image-controlled modulus. The script also implements the reported CRC-32-style boot checksum and shows it can be recomputed for modified code. The README additionally discusses CVE-2026-84696 vendor-unique-command authentication issues and references external real-drive tooling, but neither VUC interaction nor real hardware exploitation is implemented here. No network endpoint is called by the PoC; it operates exclusively on in-memory synthetic data.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An insecure firmware-signature-verification vulnerability in Phison PS3111-S11 controller firmware. Because the RSA public modulus is mutable and embedded in the firmware rather than anchored in immutable trusted storage, an attacker can modify firmware, supply a matching attacker-controlled public key, and have the malicious firmware accepted as valid.
A firmware-signature-verification bypass in Phison PS3111-S11 controller firmware. Because the RSA public modulus is trusted from the mutable firmware image rather than immutable storage, a local privileged attacker can create and sign arbitrary modified firmware that the controller will accept as valid.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.