F&F Filipowski mH-DEVELOPER smart-home modules before version 3.0.30 include a hardcoded SSH public key authorized for root login. The SSH daemon starts automatically and accepts root key-based authentication. An attacker possessing the corresponding private key can authenticate as root and obtain a shell, fully compromising the device. The embedded key persists across factory resets unless the filesystem is remounted.
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No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A reported vulnerability affecting F&F Filipowski mH-DEVELOPER devices; no technical impact details are provided.
A hardcoded SSH authorized key functions as a service backdoor, allowing an attacker possessing the corresponding private key to obtain a root shell and fully compromise affected devices. The key persists through factory reset.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.