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CVE-2026-84570 is a logic vulnerability in macOS Gatekeeper. Insufficient checks may allow an application to bypass Gatekeeper security checks. Apple resolved the issue through improved checks in macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, and macOS Tahoe 26.7.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a standalone exploit-validation repository, not a framework module. Its nine listed files comprise six code files, a README, a pinned ldap3 dependency file, and .gitignore. Python provides the main orchestration and unit tests; Bash provides three on-host validators; C provides a pathname/credential probe and embedded or generated proof payloads. The main harness, poc/poc.py, models CVE-2026-84568 as a two-record LDAP-to-NFS-to-automountd chain. One directory value delivers a proof binary beneath a short /home path; another supplies a traversal-bearing fstype that influences helper executable selection. It supports AutomountInformation and apple-user-homeurl routes, validates a 31-byte fstype budget, prepares Linux/macOS/external NFS delivery, starts a token-bound proof monitor, installs and reads back directory changes, and waits for independently generated autofs activity. It deliberately does not force client lookups or provide a shell. Successful proof records process credentials, which matter because root execution depends on a root-originating lookup. The research directory separates mechanisms: validate_cve_2026_84568_helper.sh isolates helper dispatch using a local /tmp payload; validate_cve_2026_84568_chain.sh adds loopback NFS delivery and compares root versus standard-user triggers; path_resolution_probe.c tests stat, realpath, posix_spawn, and an optional spawn UID. validate_cve_2026_84570_gatekeeper_device.sh separately tests LaunchServices execution of an explicitly rejected application and access to modeled device aliases. Missing nodev is not treated as proof of Gatekeeper bypass by itself. The test suite covers byte-budget handling, compiled proof payloads, callback validation, reversible staging, mocked LDAP operations, CLI guardrails, and cleanup failure handling. Recovery features include private work directories, mode-0600 backups/reports, restoration attempts, and a distinct cleanup-failure exit status. The shell validators alter local directory records, mounts, NFS exports, and daemon state; their rm -rf commands are guarded cleanup of fixed laboratory directories, not evidence of a fake exploit. The README reports successful validation on macOS 26.4 build 25E246 arm64 and claims fixes in Sequoia 15.8, Tahoe 26.7, and Golden Gate 27. These claims were not independently verified. Several supplied files are truncated, so full implementation correctness and complete endpoint coverage cannot be established. No repository URL, git reference, or archive size was supplied; empty URL/ref and zero size represent unavailable metadata. The listed file sizes total 145,928 bytes, which is not an archive-size measurement. No fixed external command-and-control endpoint is visible; network addresses are configurable or loopback examples.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A logic flaw in macOS Gatekeeper checks that could allow an application to bypass Gatekeeper protections.
macOS Tahoe Gatekeeper bypass vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.