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Jenkins SAML Plugin 4.618.v441a_27fa_46d2 and earlier contains an improper authorization flaw in functionality exposed through Stapler data binding. An attacker can overwrite SAML identity-provider metadata without the administrative permission normally required to alter this security-sensitive configuration. By supplying attacker-controlled identity-provider metadata, the attacker can cause Jenkins to trust an attacker-controlled SAML identity provider and authenticate as an arbitrary Jenkins user.
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5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An authentication-bypass vulnerability in Jenkins SAML Plugin versions 4.618.v441a_27fa_46d2 and earlier. Stapler data binding can be abused to overwrite SAML identity-provider metadata with attacker-controlled content, enabling authentication as any user.
A Jenkins plugin vulnerability referenced by the 2026-09-02 Jenkins security advisory; technical details are not provided.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.