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Capgo capgo.app contains an MFA authentication bypass affecting all versions at the time of publication. The Edge JWT middleware accepts Supabase JWTs without validating the session assurance level, while the direct RBAC authorization path evaluates permissions by user identity without receiving or enforcing the session AAL. Consequently, a password-only AAL1 session can be authorized for privileged actions belonging to an account with an enrolled and verified MFA factor, despite the session not satisfying the AAL2 requirement. This differs from the MFA verification control, which correctly requires AAL2.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a self-contained Go proof-of-concept/reproduction of an authentication-assurance authorization flaw inspired by CVE-2026-88861. It has no HTTP server, external services, remote hosts, or network calls; all behavior is exercised in-memory through Go methods and unit tests. `main.go` implements signed session tokens using HMAC-SHA-256, an in-memory session/API-key store, password login issuing `aal1` sessions, MFA completion issuing `aal2` sessions, logout/revocation checks, and privileged API-key handling. The vulnerable function, `vulnerableCreatePrivilegedAPIKey`, validates token signature, active-session status, and `admin` role but fails to require `aal2`, allowing an `aal1` admin session to create a durable `app_admin_` key. `privilegedActionWithAPIKey` validates only the stored key and owner, so the key remains usable after session logout. The remediated `secureCreatePrivilegedAPIKey` independently requires both `admin` role and `aal2` assurance. `main_test.go` demonstrates the complete bypass chain, validates the secure MFA gate, confirms that role and assurance are independent requirements, and verifies that logged-out sessions cannot be stepped up. `README.md` documents the challenge, rationale, CWE/OWASP mapping, and explicitly states that it is an original local reproduction rather than code targeting an external production service.
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