S2OPC through version 1.7.3 contains a null pointer dereference in msg_subscription_publish_bs__alloc_notification_message_items(). The function can overwrite a failed allocation result for a DataChangeNotification with a successful allocation result for an EventNotificationList, leaving the data-change notification pointer null and later dereferenced.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a two-file standalone C proof of concept for CVE-2026-90782, not a network-facing exploit and not part of an exploitation framework. README.md documents compilation and four test modes, while reproducer.c implements a simplified model of S2OPC's vulnerable alloc_notification_message_items() allocation flow. The vulnerable path reuses one status variable for DataChangeNotification and EventNotificationList allocations. When the first allocation is forced to fail and the subsequent event allocation succeeds, the successful status overwrites the failure state; the code then passes its status guard and dereferences the still-NULL DataChangeNotification pointer. Test 2 intentionally causes this crash. The program also contains a fixed implementation using independent allocation status tracking and safe dereference gating, plus normal and data-only control cases. Allocation failure is simulated with local flags and calloc; the code contains no sockets, URLs, IP addresses, domains, OPC UA endpoints, command execution, shell payload, or interaction with an installed S2OPC target.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.