CVE-2026-9789 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Acer NitroSense versions prior to 3.01.3052. The issue is in the PSAdminAgent service, which creates a Windows Named Pipe with a weak access control list, allowing any authenticated local user to connect to it. The service accepts commands over that pipe and does not properly validate the caller's privileges before executing file deletion operations. As a result, a low-privileged local user can cause arbitrary file deletion using SYSTEM-level authority.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, focused local privilege escalation exploit for CVE-2026-9789 affecting Acer NitroSense/PredatorSense PSAdminAgent.exe on Windows. The repo contains a README with reverse-engineering notes and vulnerability details, plus a single Python exploit script. The exploit is not network-based; it targets a local named pipe exposed by the Acer service. In exploit.py, find_pipe() enumerates \\.\pipe and selects any pipe whose name contains 'predatorsense' or 'nitrosense'. delete_file() then crafts a binary message using command ID 0x0003 and a UTF-16LE encoded attacker-supplied file path, opens the pipe with read/write access via pywin32 CreateFile, writes the payload, reads a response, and closes the handle. The practical capability is arbitrary file deletion as SYSTEM, which can enable privilege escalation indirectly by deleting security controls or protected files. The README states the root cause is an overly permissive named pipe ACL plus lack of path validation and caller authentication in the delete_file handler. Overall, this is a real operational PoC exploit with a hardcoded command format and a user-supplied target path, intended to demonstrate SYSTEM-level arbitrary file deletion through the vulnerable Acer service.
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