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BookingPress Appointment Booking Pro for WordPress versions before 5.7.3 incorrectly invokes its REST API permission callback. As a result, every route in an affected API namespace is accessible without authentication, enabling attackers to retrieve customer booking data and alter bookings belonging to other users.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone Python exploit PoC for CVE-2026-9830 targeting an alleged unauthenticated BookingPress Pro REST API exposure on WordPress sites. The repository contains three files: LICENSE, README.md, and a single code file, main.py. The README describes the tool as an assessment/validation utility and warns that returned data may contain sensitive personal information. The main exploit logic is implemented in the BookingPressExploit class in main.py. It normalizes a supplied target URL, configures a requests.Session with optional User-Agent, timeout, and proxy settings, and then interacts with the BookingPress Pro REST route /wp-json/bookingpress_pro/v1/bookings. The check_vulnerability() method sends an unauthenticated GET request with a JSON body containing {"action":"get_bookings"} and treats HTTP 200 plus a JSON success indicator or presence of a bookings field as evidence of exposure. The exploit() method repeats the request and supports optional filtering parameters such as booking_id, date_from, and date_to to narrow returned records. Based on the visible code and README, the exploit’s primary capability is unauthorized data retrieval rather than code execution. It appears intended to enumerate or extract booking/customer records, then optionally parse and display fields such as booking ID, customer name, email, phone, service, date, time, and status. It can also save the raw JSON response to a local file for later review. This makes it an operational data-exposure exploit rather than a mere detector, because it includes logic to retrieve and process the exposed records. No external C2, hardcoded IPs, or third-party callback infrastructure are present. The only meaningful target endpoint is the BookingPress Pro REST API path on the supplied WordPress host. Overall, this is a focused single-file web exploit PoC for validating and exploiting unauthenticated access to BookingPress Pro booking data.
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