CVE-2026-9973 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the V8 engine in Google Chrome versions before 148.0.7778.216. A remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability through a crafted HTML page to execute arbitrary code inside the browser sandbox. Chromium-based Microsoft Edge and Debian Chromium packages are also affected until their respective fixes are installed. The specific vulnerable function is not identified.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single exploit script (exp.js) and a README documenting the vulnerable V8 version, build environment, and execution method. The exploit is a real JavaScript/WebAssembly memory-corruption PoC for CVE-2026-9973, targeting a V8 Turboshaft Load Elimination bug involving incorrect Phi handling in Wasm GC code. Structure and purpose: - README.md: describes the bug fix reference, vulnerable environment (Ubuntu 24.04 x64, V8 14.8.178.21), build flags, usage via d8, and a sample result showing a fake JSArray/object address. - exp.js: full exploit logic. Main exploit flow in exp.js: 1. Loads V8's wasm-module-builder helper. 2. Defines Utils for float/int conversions, 64-bit packing/unpacking, and GC grooming. 3. trigger(addr): constructs a malicious Wasm module using GC array/struct types and many mutable globals. The generated function exploits optimizer confusion around loop-carried references and bounds-check elimination, causing an out-of-bounds write via array.set. 4. Post-corruption stage uses crafted JS arrays (arr1/arr2) to corrupt array metadata, extend array length, and build classic exploitation primitives: - addrof(obj): leaks an object's address. - get_fake_obj(addr): materializes a fake object at a chosen address. - cage_read(addr) / cage_write(addr, value): sandboxed arbitrary read/write helpers. 5. Final stage prints the forged object's address and invokes %DebugPrint and %SystemBreak for debugging/verification. Capabilities: - Triggers JIT/optimizer-induced memory corruption in V8. - Achieves JSArray metadata corruption. - Produces addrof and fakeobj primitives. - Provides in-sandbox arbitrary read/write helpers. - Demonstrates exploitability but does not include a full V8 sandbox escape or native code execution payload. There are no external network callbacks, C2 endpoints, or remote targets in the code. The only fingerprintable artifacts are local file dependencies and upstream bug/fix references. Overall, this is an operational local/browser-engine exploit PoC rather than a detection script or framework module.
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A high-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in Chrome's V8 engine permits remote arbitrary code execution inside the browser sandbox through a crafted HTML page. The advisory also identifies affected Chromium packages. Its CVSS v3 base score is 8.8, and exploitation requires user interaction. The reference does not describe a sandbox escape.
A High-severity out-of-bounds write vulnerability in Chrome's V8 JavaScript engine.
An out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the V8 engine rated High by Chrome.
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