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Malware4 associated actors1 associated CVE

CHAINSHOT

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs84Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-5002via palo alto networks unit 42 blogExploited in the wildStack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Flash PlayerWe uncovered part of a new toolkit which was used as a downloader alongside Adobe Flash exploit CVE-2018-5002 to target victims in the Middle East.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Stealth Falcon

“CHAINSHOT is an exploit kit that has previously been associated with Candiru. It has been observed in use by threat actor groups such as Stealth Falcon and SandCat, the latter believed to be linked to the Uzbek government.”

via recordedfutureassets.recordedfuture.com
SandCat

“CHAINSHOT is an exploit kit that has previously been associated with Candiru. It has been observed in use by threat actor groups such as Stealth Falcon and SandCat, the latter believed to be linked to the Uzbek government.”

via recordedfutureassets.recordedfuture.com
Candiru

"CHAINSHOT is an exploit kit that has previously been associated with Candiru."

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
PuzzleMaker

"CHAINSHOT is an exploit kit that has previously been associated with Candiru."

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588Obtain CapabilitiesEvidence1

The group’s mistakes led Kaspersky to discover four zero-day exploits SandCat had purchased from third-party brokers to target victim machines

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The malicious Microsoft Excel document contains a tiny Shockwave Flash ActiveX object... The “Movie” property contains a URL to a Flash application which is downloaded in cleartext and then executed.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

"...Candiru has used both actor-controlled links, such as spearphishing emails... Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) disclosed in 2021... exploited by Candiru... distributed via single-use links sent to specific targets..."

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The Flash application is an obfuscated downloader which creates a random 512-bit RSA key pair in memory of the process.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

By doing so, the function NtProtectVirtualMemory is executed without calling it directly. This trick is likely used to bypass AVs/sandboxes/anti-exploit software which hook NtProtectVirtualMemory and the attacker probably chose NtPrivilegedServiceAuditAlarm as a trampoline as it’s unlikely to be ever be monitored.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

SandCat was also using a zero-day exploit to install Chainshot.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

FirstStageDropper.dll is responsible for injecting SecondStageDropper.dll into another process to execute it. While the samples we obtained inject SecondStageDropper.dll in usermode via thread injection, the x64 shellcode seems to have an option to inject it from kernelmode.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

FirstStageDropper.dll is responsible for injecting SecondStageDropper.dll into another process to execute it. While the samples we obtained inject SecondStageDropper.dll in usermode via thread injection, the x64 shellcode seems to have an option to inject it from kernelmode.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The encrypted exploit or payload is sent back to the downloader which uses the in-memory private key to decrypt the AES key and the exploit or payload.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

This trick is likely used to bypass AVs/sandboxes/anti-exploit software which hook NtProtectVirtualMemory...

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The shellcode loads an embedded DLL internally named FirstStageDropper.dll, which we call CHAINSHOT, into memory and runs it by calling its export function “__xjwz97”.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

While the shellcode payload only contains code to search for and bypass EMET, FirstStageDropper.dll also contains code for Kaspersky and Bitdefender.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It also collects and sends encrypted user system and process information data together with a unique hardcoded ID to the attacker's server.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

This trick is likely used to bypass AVs/sandboxes/anti-exploit software which hook NtProtectVirtualMemory...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware sends user information encrypted to the attacker server and attempts to download a final stage implant... CHAINSHOT contacts the following domains via HTTPS to get the final payload.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

84 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
recorded future blogNews · Aug 5, 2025Tracking Candiru’s DevilsTongue Spyware in Multiple CountriesExploit kit associated with Candiru used to deliver spyware; linked via shared infrastructure/fingerprints to Candiru-related delivery URLs. Reported in use by multiple threat actor groups and connected to exploitation activity enabling final-stage spyware delivery.Read more ↗viceNews · Oct 3, 2019Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSECA previously known malware used by multiple nation-state actors in the Middle East and installed via zero-day exploits in SandCat operations.Read more ↗paloalto researchcenter historicNews · Sep 6, 2018Slicing and Dicing CVE-2018-5002 Payloads: New CHAINSHOT MalwareA multi-stage targeted malware framework used alongside an Adobe Flash exploit. It decrypts staged payloads, loads an embedded FirstStageDropper.dll, gathers victim system and process information, attempts to bypass security products such as EMET, Kaspersky, and Bitdefender, injects a second-stage DLL into another process, and downloads a final payload from attacker-controlled HTTPS infrastructure.Read more ↗palo alto networks unit 42 blogNews · Sep 6, 2018Slicing and Dicing CVE-2018-5002 Payloads: New CHAINSHOT MalwareA multistage malware toolkit delivered through malicious Excel documents and an Adobe Flash exploit. Its shellcode loads FirstStageDropper.dll, which collects and encrypts system and process information and injects SecondStageDropper.dll into another process. The second-stage downloader checks for security software and attempts to retrieve a final implant over HTTPS; researchers could not obtain that final payload. CHAINSHOT includes security-product detection and bypass logic, custom error reporting, and tightly interdependent execution stages. Researchers decrypted captured payloads because the delivery chain used insecure 512-bit RSA keys. Embedded kernel-mode shellcode suggested an alternative injection capability, but its execution and exact purpose were not established.Read more ↗
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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching84Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.